DO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS AND AUDITING CURB REAL AND ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS MANAGEMENT?  EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL by Martinez, Antonio Lopo
 




Revista Universo Contábil, ISSN 1809-3337   
Blumenau, v. 7, n. 4, p. 98-117, out./dez., 2011 
 
doi:10.4270/ruc.2011433 
Disponível em www.furb.br/universocontabil 
 
 
DO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS AND AUDITING 
CURB REAL AND ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS MANAGEMENT?  
EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL1 
LISTAGEM EM SEGMENTOS ESPECIAIS DE GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA E A 
AUDITORIA MINIMIZAM O GERENCIAMENTO DE RESULTADOS POR ESCOLHAS 
CONTÁBEIS E POR DECISÕES OPERACIONAIS? EVIDÊNCIAS DO BRASIL 
 
 
Antonio Lopo Martinez 
Doutor em Controladoria e Contabilidade pela FEA-USP 
Doutor em Administração pela EAESP-FGV 
Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis 
 da Fucape Business School 
Endereço: Av. Fernando Ferrari, 1358 Boa Vista 
CEP: 29075-505 – Vitória/ES – Brasil 
E-mail: lopo@fucape.br 
Telefone: (27) 4009-4444 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines whether enhanced corporate gov rnance practices, auditing by one of 
the Big Four and qualified auditors’ opinions, are ssociated with the propensity to engage in 
earnings management through accounting choices or operational decisions in Brazil. Although 
there are some studies on earnings management by Brazilian companies, very few have 
examined the presence of operational decisions in this practice and none has addressed how to 
minimize this. In order to infer earnings manipulation by accounting choices and operational 
decisions, we investigate if firms that manage earnings through discretionary accruals also 
make operational decisions for the same purpose. Th evidence from a sample of Brazilian 
firms suggests that listing on the São Paulo Stock Exchange´s Corporate Governance Special 
Listing Segments, which requires enhanced corporate governance practices, among other 
requirements, and auditing by one of the Big Four firms reduce in general earnings 
management by accounting choices, and that qualified opinion from auditor  is an indicator of 
earnings management. However, except in special cases, li ting in the Corporate Governance 
Special Listing Segments and auditing by the Big Four do not assure less earnings 
management by operational decisions.  
                                                
1 Artigo recebido em 01.10.2010. Revisado por pares em 20.12.2010. Reformulado em 22.02.2011. 
Recomendado para publicação em 24.02.2011 por Ilse Maria Beuren (Editora). Publicado em 31.10.2011. 
Organização responsável pelo periódico: FURB. 
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RESUMO 
O artigo examina como a listagem em segmentos especiais de governança corporativa, o tipo 
de auditoria e o parecer dos auditores estão associados com a propensão ao gerenciamento 
de resultados por escolhas contábeis e por decisões op racionais. Embora existam alguns 
estudos sobre gerenciamento de resultados pelas empresas brasileiras, mas poucos têm 
examinado a presença de decisões operacionais nesta prá ica e nenhum abordou como 
minimizar isso. De modo a inferir o gerenciamento de resultados por escolhas contábeis e 
por decisões operacionais, investigamos se as empresas que gerenciam ganhos através de 
acumulações discricionárias também tomam decisões op racionais para a mesma finalidade. 
As evidências obtidas para empresas brasileiras sugerem que a listagem em segmentos 
especiais e a auditoria por Big4 reduzem o gerenciamento de resultados por escolhas 
contábeis, entretanto, esses mesmos fatores não minimizam o gerenciamento por decisões 
operacionais. 
 
Palavras-chave: Gerenciamento de resultados por escolhas contábeis. Gerenciamento de 
resultados por decisões operacionais. Acumulações discricionárias.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Most research indicates that discretionary accruals are the main mechanism employed 
by accountants and managers to manage earnings. Examples are McNichols and Wilson 
(1988), Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 
(1995), Martinez (2001), Fuji (2004), Tukamoto (2005), Almeida et al. (2005). Irrespective of 
the methodological focus (discretionary accruals or descriptive-inferential statistics), all these 
authors have investigated the manipulation of accounting numbers through accounting 
choices. In contrast, there are very few works in the literature examining earnings 
management through operational decisions.  
Of these few studies of manipulation of accounting figures through operational 
decisions, the standouts are Roychowdhury (2003; 2005), Gunny (2005), Zang (2005). These 
authors variously call this practice earnings management through real activities manipulation 
(ROYCHOWDHURY, 2005), real earnings management (GUNNY, 2005) or real 
manipulation (ZANG, 2005). Here we use earnings management through operational 
decisions. 
Strictly speaking, Roychowdhury (2005, p. 3) defines making operational decisions to 
manipulate accounting figures as “departures from nrmal operational practices, motivated by 
managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholdrs into believing certain financial 
reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations” (underscoring added).  
Roychowdhury (2005) sought to identify whether firms make certain operational 
decisions (related to sales, level of output and timing of discretionary expenses) to manipulate 
accounting numbers to avoid reporting losses. In tur , Gunny (2005) aimed to identify the 
consequences of operational decisions to manipulate e rnings, that is, she investigated 
whether these decisions affect the ability to generate cash flow and earnings in future periods, 
as well as if analysts perceive these manipulations. Finally, Zang (2005) used a framework 
based on cost-benefit analysis to identify whether firms with less flexible accounting practices 
(subject to stricter accounting regulation) make operational decisions to manipulate 
accounting information more than do other firms. She also investigated the order (timing and 
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intensity) between the two forms of manipulating accounting numbers – operational decisions 
and accounting decisions. 
According to Tirole (2006), even without resorting to fraud, managers have substantial 
discretion in their financial statements. That is, they enjoy flexibility even within the confined 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. For example, the provisions for loan losses is 
always subjective. Of course the underprovision only shifts loss recognition in time. In the 
same way, the choice between capitalizing and expensing investment costs, shift income 
across time.  Other than accounting choice the firm may distort its strategy in order to alter the 
external perception of the firm´s condition. For example, in order to inflate current profits, the 
firm may delay maintenance and reduce its inventory level. Or it may run end-or-period sales. 
Instead of slashing its price in January, it can boost the previous year´s profit by running 
December sales at the cost of reducing overall profit. 
Pernicious earnings management fits the general conception of earnings management 
as misrepresentation (DEMSKI, 2003). This is the example when the firm attempts to mask 
poor performance and mislead its audience. In this context, corporate governance has a 
gatekeeping role of preventing pernicious earnings management and others antithetical 
practices.  
In this work we use our own models to infer earnings management by accounting 
choices and operational decisions, to investigate wh ther Brazilian companies listed in the 
Bovespa´s Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments and audited by the Big Four 
manage earnings through these two procedures. Additionally, we analyze whether firms that 
manage earnings through discretionary accruals also make operational decisions for the same 
purpose. 
The evidence obtained from our sample of firms suggests that those listed in the 
Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments and audited by the Big Four have lower 
propensity to manage their earnings by accounting choices. However, on the matter of 
earnings management through operational decisions, the results indicate that except in special 
cases, listing in the Bovespa´s Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments and being 
audited by one of the Big Four does not discourage earnings management.  
This paper is organized in six sections including this introduction. In the next section 
we present a brief literature review and in the third  and forth sections we discuss the research 
hypotheses and methodology, such as the empirical proxies for earnings management, along 
with the nature of the studies carried out. The results are analyzed in the fifth section and the 
sixth section presents our conclusions. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate governance covers a range of practices and relationships among all 
interested parties, or stakeholders, inside and outside the company. The overall aim is to 
increase the value of the company, through transparency, respect for shareholders’ rights, 
equal treatment of shareholders and rendering of trustworthy accounts. These corporate 
governance rules in their essence aim to increase the firm’s efficiency. 
In listed companies, a transparent posture by management, equal treatment and 
rendering of accurate accounts is of great importance because it involves the interests of 
controlling and minority shareholders, executive officers and members of the board of 
directors and its various committees (particularly the audit committee and compensation 
committee). Other interested parties are employees, cu tomers, suppliers, creditors and 
independent auditors, all of whom take part in the game of often conflicting interests in terms 
of information, rights, form of remuneration and the entire decision process within the firm. 
Bowen (2005) found that weak corporate governance makes earnings management 
easier, since the shareholders have information enabling them to make inferences about future 
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events such as cash flow and stock returns. Various st dies have analyzed a variety of 
corporate governance practices as potential ways to limit earnings management. 
The specific theme of income smoothing and its relationship with firms’ ownership 
structure has not attracted substantial attention fr m researchers. Authors such as Berle and 
Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), among others, have studied the ownership and 
control structures of companies in several countries. In Brazil, works such as those of Rapozo 
et al. (2007), Ribeiro et al. (2006), Okimura et al. (2004), Fontes Filho (2003) and Silveira 
(2004) have investigated the theme, relating it with o her variables, and have noted that the 
great majority of Brazilian companies have a concentrated ownership and control structure. 
Good corporate governance practices should adequately encourage the directors and 
officers to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and shareholders, to 
optimize the return on their investments and to assure ustained long-term growth. 
According to Yamamoto (2003, p. 13), “nowadays a company’s management failings 
can cause not only huge losses to the shareholders; th y can also jeopardize the credibility of 
the market as a whole, with unpredictable reflections on the level of general economic 
activity”. 
The basic management structure of corporations in Brazil is established by Law 6,404 
of 1976, as amended. This structure is organized as follows: (i) the general shareholders’ 
meeting, which is the highest decision-making body; (ii) the board of directors; (iii) the 
executive board; and (iv) the oversight board.  
All corporations must hold general meetings (at least once a year) and have an 
executive board. Only listed corporations and those with pre-authorized capital (allowing 
them to go public without amending the bylaws) must have a board of directors. The 
oversight board (conselho fiscal)  only must be established by law in certain situations, such 
as during liquidation. Listed corporations must also submit their financial statements to 
examination by an independent auditor approved by the Brazilian Securities Commission 
(Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – CVM).  
Xie et al. (2001) stated that the board of directors can play an important role in 
discouraging earnings management, particularly if one or more members have relevant 
experience in finance or accounting or if there is an audit committee and/or compensation 
committee. A director with previous financial or accounting experience will obviously be 
more able to ferret out manipulation of the results. And the existence of a special committee 
with responsibility for accounting or compensation matters will also tend to discourage 
earnings management, in the latter case because executive compensation is often tied to 
earnings results.  
Beasley (1996) reported that fraud in the financial st tements is less of a problem for 
firms with a relatively high proportion of independent directors. Similarly, Peasnell et al. 
(2000) indicated that the probability that managers will engage in abnormal accruals to avoid 
losses or smooth income is negatively related to the proportion of external directors. 
Marrakchi et al. (2001) stated that earnings management is significantly negatively related to 
certain corporate governance practices such as the existence of an audit committee and other 
board characteristics, such as the existence of at least one member with financial with 
financial expertise and a clear mandate tor oversee both the financial statements and external 
audit. 
Good corporate government practices generally include the creation by the board of 
directors of committees devoted to specific duties to help the full board reach more informed 
decisions. According to Costa (2004), these committees help relieve the matters that need 
detailed consideration by the full board. The audit committee is one of these. As the name 
suggests, it is entrusted with the various matters involving the rendering of accounts and their 
disclosure and the relationship with the independent auditors. 




Revista Universo Contábil, ISSN 1809-3337, FURB, Blumenau, v. 7, n. 4, p. 98-117, out./dez., 2011 
102 
Agrawal (2004) found evidence that having an independent audit committee with at 
least one member with specific expertise in finance made firms less likely to manage 
earnings. The same general result was found by Xie et al. (2001), and Marrakchi et al. (2001) 
found indications that effective directors and audit committees tend to confine earnings 
management. Klein (2002) also found a negative relationship between the independence of 
the audit committee and earnings management. However, Peasnell et al. (2000) mentioned 
there was little evidence that the presence of an audit committee influences the level of 
earnings management one way or the other. 
With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Brazilian companies with securities 
traded in the United States became subject to the rule requiring the establishment of an audit 
committee. However, companies with securities traded indirectly through American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) can establish the oversight board instead of an audit committee. 
Barcellos (2005) mentioned that for the majority of Brazilian companies the 
establishment of an audit committee in the American mold implies alterations in the board of 
directors involving a change in the power structure. The main reason is the requirement under 
American law that the audit committee be formed of at least three independent directors – not 
only of management and the external auditors, but also of the controlling shareholders. In 
contrast, the oversight board only needs to be independent of management and the external 
auditors, not of the controlling shareholders. Indeed, the latter is not possible by definition, 
because it is composed of members elected by the controlling and minority shareholders.  
This requirement by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act touched off debate over how close the 
functions of the oversight board and audit committee are and whether the formation of an 
audit committee is really necessary in Brazil. The Chart 1 compares the main features of the 
two bodies. 
 
Oversight Board Audit Committee 
Has one or more representatives of minority 
shareholders 
Chosen from among the board of directors 
Not subordinated to the board of directors Drawn from the board of directors 
Issues opinions on the financial statements, among 
other matters at the behest of the general meeting 
Supervises the audit and has authority to determine 
adjustments in the accounts 
Oversees, analyzes and issues opinions or 
denunciations on failure by the directors and officers to 
comply with their legal and bylaw duties and any other 
practice that can harm the company 
Is a management body  
Chart 1 - Comparison between the oversight board and audit committee in Brazil 
 
According to Chaves (2005), there is no risk of overlap between the functions of the 
two bodies. The oversight board is legally charged with denouncing any errors, fraudulent 
acts or crimes committed by the board of directors and executive board to the general meeting 
(art. 163 of Law 6,404/76). This is not the mission of the audit committee, both because of its 
composition (drawn from the board of directors) andthe absence of legal prerogatives such as 
those of the oversight board. 
Another important corporate governance practice is the existence of effective 
independent auditing. The main role of outside auditors is to examine the adequacy of the 
financial statements, to attest that they faithfully reflect the financial and economic situation 
reported to users. Because auditors attest to financial reports, they are probably the most 
important gatekeeper for blocking pernicious earnings management. 
Corporate governance depends upon gatekeepers to protect the interests of investors 
and shareholders by monitoring the behavior of corporate insiders and by reporting the 
financial results of corporate performance in an accurate and unbiased fashion. Gatekeepers 
are independent professionals who are interposed between investors and managers in order to 
DO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SPECIAL LISTING SEGMENTS AND AUDITING CURB REAL 
AND ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS MANAGEMENT? EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL 
 
 
Revista Universo Contábil, ISSN 1809-3337, FURB, Blumenau, v. 7, n. 4, p. 98-117, out./dez., 2011 
103 
play a watchdog role that reduces the agency costs of corporate governance (COFFEE, 2001). 
 
3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The main objective of this study is to identify the factors that affect the practice of 
earnings management both by accounting choices and operational decisions. In Brazil, 
previous authors have employed discretionary accruals models – both general models 
(MARTINEZ, 2001; TUKAMOTO, 2005) and models of specific accounts (FUJI, 2004) – 
and frequency distribution analysis (CARDOSO, 2005).  
In Brazil, Martinez and Cardoso (2009) provided evid nces for the existence of earnings 
management through real activities manipulation in Brazilian publicly traded companies. 
With this study we hope to contribute to the understanding of earnings management so that in 
the near future it will be possible to develop a theory able to understand its incentives and 
counter-incentives, mechanisms and consequences. 
In recent years the Brazilian and international academic literature has shown growing 
interest in corporate governance. A question that arises is whether listing in the Bovespa´s 
Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments, which requires meeting enhanced corporate 
governance standards, is a factor that minimizes both types of earnings management. 
Therefore, we formulated the following research hypothesis: 
 
H1: If a firm’s securities are traded in the Bovespa´ Corporate Governance Special Listing 
Segments, it has a lower propensity to manage its earnings by accounting choices and 
operational decisions. 
 
In December 2000, Bovespa created three special listing egments designed for firms 
that voluntarily decide to commit themselves to higher corporate governance standards: Level 
1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado (New Market – equivalent to a Level 3). The extent of a 
company´s commitment to the adoption of better corporate governance practices classifies it 
as Level 1, Level 2, or Novo Mercado, where Level 1 has the least stringent requirements and 
the Novo Mercado the most comprehensive set of governance provisions. 
Another question is the effect of the oversight by external auditors on earnings 
management. The Brazilian Securities Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – 
CVM) describes the duties and responsibilities of independent auditors as: (i) verification of 
the financial statements and preparation of an opini n on them; (ii) preparation of internal 
control reports for the board of directors, executive board and oversight board (Conselho 
Fiscal), when applicable; (iii) safeguarding of all pertinent documentation for a period of five 
years; (iv) clear indication of any accounting procedures in conflict with generally accepted 
accounting principles; (v) allowing access to documents for oversight by the CVM; and (vi) in 
the event of substitution of the auditor, provision of the necessary information to serve as the 
basis for issuance of special revisions and audit reports. 
The oversight board is elected by the shareholders at the general meeting and acts as a 
watchdog over the firm’s affairs, independent of the board of directors and executive board. It 
is not mandatory to have an oversight board, except for public companies in certain situations, 
such as during liquidation or reorganization. 
In the final analysis, the service of independent auditors is for the benefit of the 
shareholders, as an instrument to monitor managers. Although auditing is unquestionably 
important, it also must be recognized that in certain situations the relations between auditing 
firms and their clients’ shareholders can create an agency conflict. While audit firms should 
above all heed the interests of the shareholders, they are also concerned with maximizing their 
utility to management. 
In this context, auditing firms worry about losing their clients and the respective 
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revenue. This problem can be more serious for smaller uditing firms, since the importance of 
the revenue from a particular client will likely begreater. In cases of accounting problems it is 
much more likely that a large auditor will have greater independence to question the financial 
statements and accounting practices than will a small audit firm. 
Boynton et al. (2002) mentioned that independence is the basis of the auditing 
profession, in the sense that the auditor must be disinterested, and hence objective, in relation 
to the company audited. This fairness is the very essence of auditing and the basis for public 
trust in the role of auditors. 
Many studies have utilized the name of the auditing firm as a proxy for the quality of 
the auditing performed and have examined the associati n between this identity and the 
quality of the results (BECKER et al. 1998; ALMEIDA, 2007). Some researchers 
(BEASLEY; PETRONI, 2001) have raised hypotheses, beides the name of the auditing firm, 
of whether specialization in the auditing field has a positive effect on the credibility offered 
by the auditor.  
Based on these considerations, we also formulated the following research hypothesis: 
 
H2: Companies audited by one of the Big Four are lessikely to manage their earnings 
through accounting choices or operational decisions. 
 
Does a qualified opinion from auditor signal earnings management?  The answer to 
this question is that best a qualified opinion is a negative but noisy signal. A reasonable 
expectation is that when the auditors’ opinion contains reservations, this indicates the 
company is managing its earnings, suggesting the following hypothesis. 
 
H3: Qualified opinion from the auditor is an indicator f earnings management through 
accounting choices or operational decisions. 
 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the econometric models used and the sample studied. 
 
4.1  Econometric Models  
We investigate hypothesis H1 by employing the model veloped by Anderson, 

















































































     (1) 
 
Where: 
SG&At = selling, general and administrative expenses in year t; 
St = net sales revenue in year t; 
DSt = a dummy variable indicating the behavior of net sales revenue, which is 1 when  
          St < St-1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In this model, the coefficients α2 and α4 are expected to be positive because changes in 
SG&A normally accompany sales (S); the coefficient α3 is expected to be negative because 
SG&A should tend to remain constant over the short run; and the coefficient α5 is expected to 
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be positive, reflecting reversion of SG&A over the long run. 
The residual of equation (1) represents the abnormal level of the transaction 
(Ab_SGA), indicating companies that manipulate accounting figures through operational 
decisions related to selling, general and administrat ve expenses. The residual of equation (1) 
is in logarithmic form, so it is necessary to transform it, as suggested by Zang (2005, p. 9, 
footnote 8) – equation (2): 
 
Ab_SGA = {Exp[Log(SGAt/SGAt-1)] - Exp[Log(SGAt/SGAt-1) –  
residual of Log(SGAt/SGAt-1)]} SGAt-1 
 
    (2) 
 
This residual is then multiplied by -1 and divided by the value of the firm’s total assets 
in the previous period (At-1).  
From a technical standpoint, the greater the value of Ab_SGA, the higher the 
probability that the firm is reducing its selling, eneral and administrative overhead to 
increase its profit. In other words, companies with positive Ab_SGA are likelier to be making 
operational decisions to increase their income, while t ose with negative Ab_SGA are doing 
the same to decrease their income. 
We investigate hypothesis (H1b) by using the model developed by Roychowdhury, 
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Where: 
Prodt = COGSt + ∆Inventoriest; 
Prodt = Production costs in year t; 
COGSt = Cost of goods sold in year t;  
St = net sales revenue in year t; 
∆St = St – St-1. 
 
All the coefficients are expected to be positive, bcause the higher a firm’s sales are, 
the greater its production costs will be. 
The residual of equation (3) represents the level of abnormal production costs 
(Ab_Prod), indicating that the firm is manipulating earnings through operational decisions 
related to the level of production. An abnormal increase in production should reduce unit 
production costs, given that fixed costs would be distributed over a greater number of units. 
As long as the reduction in fixed overhead per unitis not exceeded by the marginal cost per 
unit, the total cost per unit will fall. This situation would lead to a lower cost of goods sold, 
affecting the earnings in the period. 
The model also serves to detect possible manipulation by increasing sales through 
abnormal discounts. This functionality allows applying the model to any type of firm, whether 
engaged in manufacturing, services or commerce, as argued by Roychowdhury (2005). 
In this context, a positive Ab_Prod indicates a higher probability that the firm is 
managing its earnings to increase income, while a negative Ab_Prod indicates a higher 
probability that it is doing the same to decrease it  income.  
To analyze the hypothesis (H2) it is first necessary to identify discretionary accruals. 
We do this by applying the KS model, formulated by Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) – 
equation (4). 
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[ ] [ ] [ ]0 1 1 2 2 3 3Reit it it it itAT x c xExp xPPEϕ ϕ δ ϕ δ ϕ δ ε= + × + × + × +                                  (4) 
 
Where: 
Tait = Total accruals = (∆NWC – depreciation and amortization); 
Revit = Net revenue;  
Expit = Operational costs and expenses before depreciation nd amortization; 
NWC= Net working capital, excluding cash and cash equivalents and short-term loans;  
FAit = Fixed assets;  
δ1 = ARi,t-1/Revit  ,  δ2 = (CGL – CRi,t-1)/Expi,t-1  e  δ3 =  Depri,t-1/FAi,t-1; 
ARi,t-1 = Accounts receivable in period t-1; 
Deprit = Depreciation and amortization expenses in period t; 
TA it ,ReVit ,Expit and FAit  are computed in terms of Total Assets at t-1 (At-1). 
 
The discretionary accruals (Ab_Acc) are computed as the residual of equation 4, as 
follows – equation (5): 
 
 { [ ] [ ] [ ] }0 1 1 2 2 3 3_ Reit it it it itAb Acc AT x c xExp xPPEϕ ϕ δ ϕ δ ϕ δ= − + × + × + ×            (5) 
 
Conceptually, a positive value of Ab_Acc means the firm is managing its earnings to 
increase them, while a negative value means it is doing so to reduce them. 
 
4.2  Research Sample and Estimates of the Earnings Management Proxies  
Our sample consists of Brazilian firms with shares traded on the São Paulo Stock 
Exchange (BOVESPA) – except financial institutions and insurance companies – with data 
available for 2004 and 2005 in the Economática database. However, to verify the effect of the 
empirical proxies of earnings management, we worked with data covering 1998 to 2004, also 
as available in the Economática database.  
Because of the restrictive nature of the models (particularly the KS model), which 
require information covering at least three previous periods, our final sample was restricted to 
315 firms, for an initial total of 1591 observations (firms/year). We performed all the 
statistical treatment of the data in Excel and SPSS. Table 1 presents the results of the 
regressions estimated for equations 1, 3 and 4.  
The models to estimate “normal” levels of operating expenses and production costs 
were computed in cross-section by sector for the period from 1998 to 2005. The values 
reported represent the average coefficients between the industry-year and the t-statistics of the 
standard errors, according to the procedure developed by Fama and Macbeth (1973). The 
regressions by sector are an essential requirement for the quality of the estimates, given the 
specificities of each industry. Because of the need to work with sectors, it was necessary to 
exclude those without sufficient data for a robust regression. In this context, we excluded 
from the analysis firms engaged in the software development and data processing sectors. Our 
definition of sectors followed that established by Economática.  
To calculate the empirical proxy for earnings management by accruals, we estimated 
the KS model using instrumental variables, with theindependent variables lagged by one 
period as the instruments. Calculation of a regression in two stages with instruments is a 
requirement to deal with the problem of simultaneity: since in the estimation of traditional 
accruals models (Jones and modified Jones), both the explanatory and explained variables are 
determined together, this causes autocorrelation prblems that bias the results. 
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Table 1 - Forecasting abnormal production, abnormal operational expenses and discretionary accruals 
   
 
       
 
       
TA it 
 Intercept  0,019     948,545    Intercept  0,011  
   (1,385)    
 
 (1,159)      (0,337)  
                 




 (4,332)    
 
 (65,681)      (2,144)  
                 




 (3,080)    
 
 (2,458)      8,475  
                 




 (1,553)    
 
 (1,863)      (-1,923)  
                 
  0,271 *            
 
 
 (2,064)              
              
R2 Adjusted  45,40%      98,10%      9,80%  
N. Observ.   18 sectors        18 sectors        1591 firm/year  
F  Test  N.A.      N.A.      40,671**  
                 
Procedure:  Fama&McBeth    Fama&McBeth   Instrumental Var 
   Sector      Sector     Panel Data  
 ** Sig 1%   * Sig 5%    N.A. - Not applied         
 
The statistics from the regressions in general showed good results, comparable with 
those reported in the works of Gunny (2005) and Zang (2005). From the inferred coefficients 
it was possible to identify for each company-year the levels of abnormal selling, general and 
administrative expenses (Ab_SGA), abnormal production expenses (Ab_Prod) and abnormal 
discretionary accruals (Ab_Acc).  
 
5 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSES 
 
5.1 Analysis of the Differences of Means of the Companies in the Corporate 
Governance Special Listing Segments versus Other  Firms 
We first carried out tests to verify the difference b tween the empirical proxies of 
earnings management and of companies listed in the Bovespa´s Corporate Governance 
Special Listing Segments (CGSLS), on the one hand,  between earnings management and 
firms with shares traded in either Levels 1 or 2 or the Novo Mercado segments of the Bovespa 
on the other hand. Table 2 shows the main results. 
Panel A indicates that the companies are different in average terms in all the empirical 
proxies for earnings management, both those based on accounting choices and operational 
decisions. Firms listed in the Bovespa´s Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments 
(CGSLS) manage earnings less both through accounting choices and operational decisions. 
In Panel B we performed parametric tests of differences of means to check whether 
these are consistent. These tests showed that the differences between companies in the 
Bovespa´s Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments (CGSLS) and other companies 
are significant only for earnings management through accounting choices. For the other 
metrics, the differences are not significant. 
In Panel C we applied the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test of the difference of 
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earnings management by discretionary accruals (accounting choices). 
 
Table 2 - Differences of means - Empirical proxies of earnings management Bovespa´s Corporate 
Governance Special Listing Segments (CGSLS) vs other firms 
Panel A:   Statistics    
  Bovespa N Mean 
Stand.  
Dev.  Mean Error    
Other firms 189 ,087 ,211 ,015    Abs_Acc 
CGSLS 81 ,055 ,055 ,006    
Other firms 189 ,101 ,160 ,012    Abs_Prod 
CGSLS 80 ,075 ,119 ,013    
Other firms 189 ,009 ,015 ,001    Abs_SGA 
CGSLS 80 ,008 ,021 ,002    
Panel B:  Parametric Tests 
    t-test for equal means 
   Levene´s Test   







Equal σ2 2,516 ,114 1,353 268,000 ,177 ,032 ,024 Abs_Acc 
Non Equalσ2     1,950 238,423 ,052 ,032 ,016 
Equal σ2 3,384 ,067 1,297 267,000 ,196 ,026 ,020 Abs_Prod 
Non Equalσ2     1,455 196,485 ,147 ,026 ,018 
Equal σ2 ,073 ,787 ,508 267,000 ,612 ,001 ,002 Abs_SGA 
Non Equalσ2     ,455 118,747 ,650 ,001 ,003 
Panel C: Non Parametric Tests      
  Abs_Acc Abs_Prod Abs_SGA      
Mann-
Whitney U 
6614,000 7162,000 6634,000 
     
Wilcoxon 
W 
9935,000 10402,000 9874,000 
     




,077 ,495 ,112 
     
Notes         
Abs_Acc: Absolute value of Discretionay Accruals     
Abs_Prod: Absolute value of Abnormal Production     
Abs_SGA: Absolute value of Abnormal Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses   
 
Therefore, the statistics indicate that being listed for trading in the Bovespa´s 
Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments (CGSLS) does reduce the propensity to 
manage earnings through accounting choices, but it does not discourage doing so through 
operational decisions.  
 
5.2 Analysis of the Differences of Means Between Companies Audited by One 
of the Big Four and Those Audited by Other Firms 
To check whether being audited by one of the Big Four reduces the propensity to 
manage earnings, we again tested the differences in means. The results are presented in Table 
3. The results of Panel A show that companies audited by the non-Big Four firms have higher 
averages in all the empirical proxies for earnings management by accounting choices and by 
operational decisions as well. The results of Panel B show that companies audited by the Big 
Four are less likely to manage earnings only through accounting choices. And based on the 
same nonparametric tests, the results of Panel C confirm that only earnings management by 
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accounting choices is discouraged by being audited by one of the Big Four. 
 
Table 3 - Differences of means - Empirical proxies of earnings management Non Big4 vs. Big4 
Panel A: Statistics    




Error    
Non Big4 52 ,160 ,386 ,054    Abs_Acc 
Big4 207 ,058 ,053 ,004    
Non Big4 52 ,102 ,116 ,016    Abs_Prod 
Big4 206 ,086 ,132 ,009    
Non Big4 52 ,012 ,021 ,003    Abs_SGA 
Big4 206 ,008 ,016 ,001    
Panel B : Parametric Tests 
    t-test for equal means 
   Levene´s Test  







Equal σ2 25,437 ,000 3,658 257,000 ,000 ,101 ,028 Abs_Acc 
Non 
Equalσ2 
    
1,887 51,489 ,065 ,101 ,054 
Equal σ2 1,042 ,308 ,821 256,000 ,412 ,016 ,020 Abs_Prod 
Non 
Equalσ2 
    
,884 87,031 ,379 ,016 ,019 
Equal σ2 7,321 ,007 1,699 256,000 ,090 ,005 ,003 Abs_SGA 
Non 
Equalσ2 
    
1,490 68,420 ,141 ,005 ,003 
Panel C: Non Parametric Test      
  Abs_Acc Abs_Prod Abs_SGA      
Mann-
Whitney U 
4043,000 4852,000 5050,000 
     
Wilcoxon 25571,000 26173,000 26371,000      
 -2,774 -1,049 -,637      
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
,006 ,294 ,524 
     
a. Grouping Variable: Auditing      
Notes         
Abs_Acc: Absolute value of Discretionay Accruals     
Abs_Prod: Absolute value of Abnormal Production     
Abs_SGA: Absolute value of Abnormal Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses    
 
The statistics therefore indicate that auditing by the Big Four reduces the propensity to 
manage earnings by accounting choices but not by operational decisions. 
 
5.3  Analysis of the Difference of Means of Companies Obtaining Qualified 
and Unqualified Auditor´s Opinions 
The results of the analysis of whether a qualified auditors’ opinion indicates a 
propensity to manage earnings either through accounting choices or operational decisions are 
shown in Table 4.  
Panel A shows the averages of the empirical earnings management proxies for 
companies that received qualified an unqualified opini ns from the auditor. According to the 
results, companies receiving an opinion with reservations (qualified) have higher average 
proxy values, indicating they manage earnings both through accounting choices and 
operational decisions more than do companies receiving a clean bill of health from their 
auditors. 
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Table 4 – Difference of Means- Empirical Proxies of Earnings Manangement  Qualified and Unqualified 
Auditor´s Opinions 
Panel A: Statistics     




Mean    
Unqualified 235           
0,074 
         
0,187 
         
0,012    
Abs_Acc 
Qualified 35            
0,101 
         
0,110 
         
0,019    
Unqualified 234            
0,083 
         
0,132 
         
0,009    
Abs_Prod 
Qualified 35            
0,158 
         
0,224 
         
0,038    
Unqualified 234            
0,008 
         
0,016 
         
0,001    
Abs_SGA 
Qualified 35            
0,012 
         
0,022 
        
0,004    
Panel B:  Parametric Test 
    t-test for equal means 
   Levene´s Test   
    








Equal σ2 ,144 ,705 -,824 268,000 ,411 -,027 ,032 Abs_Acc 
Non 
Equalσ2 
    
-1,200 67,598 ,234 -,027 ,022 
Equal σ2 9,689 ,002 -2,782 267,000 ,006 -,074 ,027 Abs_Prod 
Non 
Equalσ2 
    
-1,910 37,621 ,064 -,074 ,039 
Equal σ2 6,747 ,010 -1,437 267,000 ,152 -,004 ,003 Abs_SGA 
Non 
Equalσ2 
    
-1,127 39,397 ,266 -,004 ,004 
Panel C: Non Parametric Test      
  Abs_Acc Abs_Prod Abs_SGA      
Mann-
Whitney U 
2996,000 3016,000 4038,500 
     
Wilcoxon W 30726,000 30511,000 4668,500      
Z -2,592 -2,515 -,132      
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
,010 ,012 ,895 
     
a. Grouping Variable: Opinion without and with reservations     
Notes         
Abs_Acc : Absolute value of Discretionay 
Accruals      
Abs_Prod : Absolute value of Abnormal 
Production      
Abs_SGA : Absolute value of Abnormal Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses    
 
As for the other hypotheses, in Panel B we applied parametric tests of the difference of 
means. The results suggest that companies receiving reservations are not necessarily 
managing earnings through accounting choices more aggressively than those receiving a clean 
opinion. However, on the operational side of the coin, the results were significant for earnings 
management by altering production costs, but not significant for earnings management 
through choices on other operating costs.  
Panel C presents the results of the nonparametric tests, sugge ting that companies 
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receiving a auditors’ opinions without and with reservations differ in their propensity to 
manage earnings by both accounting choices and operational decisions. 
 
5.4 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5 shows the pairwise Spearman correlations between th variables and the 
statistical significance in each case.  
 
Table 5 - Correlation Analysis 
      CGSLS Auditing Qualified Abs_Acc Abs_Prod Abs_SGA 
Coeff Correl 1,000 ,297** -,036 -,108 -,042 -,097 CGSLS 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 ,555 ,077 ,496 ,112 
Coeff Correl ,297** 1,000 -,253** -,173** -,065 -,040 Auditing 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,000 ,005 ,295 ,525 
Coeff Correl -,036 -,253** 1,000 ,158** ,154* -,008 Qualified 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,555 ,000  ,009 ,012 ,896 
Coeff Correl -,108 -,173** ,158** 1,000 ,092 ,262** Abs_Acc 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,077 ,005 ,009  ,132 ,000 
Coeff Correl -,042 -,065 ,154* ,092 1,000 ,141* Abs_Prod 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,496 ,295 ,012 ,132  ,021 




Sig. (2-tailed) ,112 ,525 ,896 ,000 ,021  
**. Correlation is significant at level of 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at level of 0.05 (2-tailed). 
Notes         
Abs_Acc: Absolute value of Discretionay 
Accruals      
Abs_Prod
: 
Absolute value of Abnormal 
Production      
Abs_SGA
: 
Absolute value of Abnormal Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses   
  
The analysis of the correlations between earnings management by operational 
decisions and accruals shows a positive and significa t relation for Abs_SGA and Abs_Acc. 
This implies that in the general sample, when a company is managing its earnings through 
manipulation of selling, general and administrative expenses, it is doing so in the same 
direction through accruals. For the sample as a whole, there was not significant correlation 
between Abs_Prod and Abs_Acc. 
For the Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments´ variable, there is a strong 
positive correlation with Auditing, indicating that companies listed in the Corporate 
Governance Special Listing Segments generally are audited by one of the Big Four firms. 
Both the Auditing and Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments´ variables have a 
strong negative correlation with Abs_Acc, suggesting hat companies audited by one of the 
Big Four engage in less earnings management by accounting choices. There is also a strong 
negative correlation between the Auditing variable and receiving an opinion with 
reservations, indicating that companies audited by the Big Four tend to receive fewer 
reservations. 
There is a positive and significant correlation between receiving an opinion with 
reservations and both Abs_Acc and Abs_Prod. These rults indicate that companies 
receiving reservations tend to manage earnings throug  accounting choices more actively, as 
well as being more likely to manage earnings through operational decisions linked to the level 
of production. 
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5.5  Multivariate Analysis 
To check the nature of the relations between the variables, we performed regressions 
seeking to observe the behavior of the earnings management proxies in function of the various 
explanatory variables. We developed a linear regression model, expressed in the following 
form:   
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 5
_ _ Pr _
/ Pr /
t t t t t t
t t t t
Abs Acc CGSLS Auditing Qualified Abs od Abs SGA
Varroa Debt Assets ice Book
β β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + + +
+ + +
       (6) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5_ _Pr _t t t t t t tAbs SGA CGSLS Auditing Qualified Abs od Abs Accβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +     (7) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5_ Pr _ _t t t t t t tAbs od CGSLS Auditing Qualified Abs Acc Abs SGAβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +     (8) 
 
Where: 
Abs_Acc t= absolute value of discretionary accruals in year t; 
Abs_Prod  t-= absolute value of abnormal production in year t; 
Abs_SGA t = absolute value of abnormal production in year t 
CGSLS t-= dummy variable Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments in year t; 
Auditing t = dummy variable for “Big Four” Auditing firm in year t;  
Qualified t-= dummy variable for Qualified opinion in year t; 
Varroa t = variation of return on assets in year t; 
Debt/Asset t = Debt /Total Assets in year t; 
Price/Book t = Price/ book value of shares in year t. 
 
Interaction Variables were not added to the model, b cause when this was done it 
showed high multicollinearity. This fact can be explained by the strong relationship between 
some of the explanatory variables and some of the interactions. 
Table 6 presents the results of the model seeking to explain the behavior of Abs_Acc. 
The regression has reasonable statistics, in which t e only statistically significant variables are 
Auditing and Abs_Prod. The other variables, particularly the control variables utilized, are not 
statistically significant. 
 




Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) ,112 ,021   5,443 ,000 
CGSLS -,009 ,015 -,043 -,596 ,552 
Auditing -,059 ,020 -,232 -3,014 ,003 
Qualified ,019 ,021 ,068 ,942 ,347 
Abs_Prod ,087 ,050 ,124 1,752 ,081 
Abs_SGA ,035 ,380 ,006 ,093 ,926 
Varroa ,009 ,016 ,040 ,574 ,566 
Debt/Assets ,000 ,000 ,027 ,368 ,713 
6 
Price/Book -,001 ,001 -,040 -,586 ,558 
a. Dependent Variable: Abs_Acc 
Statistics R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Forecast Error F Sig. 
Model 6 ,322 ,104 ,067 ,095207 2,806 ,006 
 
These results suggest that companies audited by one of the Big Four have a lower 
propensity to manage earnings (t= -3.014). Likewise, Abs_Acc is positively correlated with 
Abs_Prod, which indicates that manage earnings through accounting choices also do this by 
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operational decisions in the same direction. 
The signs estimated for the Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments´ variable 
indicate that companies listed in this segment do not necessarily manage their earnings less. 
On the matter of receiving a qualified opinion from auditors, although the sign indicates a 
tendency to increased earnings management by accounting choices, this is not significant 
enough to permit claiming that it is an indicator of earnings management by accounting 
choices. 
For the regression analysis to explain Abs_SGA, we formulated the model shown in 
Table 7, which through satisfactory statistics identifies a positive and significant relation 
between Abs_Prod and Abs_SGA. With respect to the control variables utilized, only the 
Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments reduces the propensity of manage earnings 
by operational decisions with a level of significane lower than 10%. The Auditing variable, 
although negative, does not reach the normal significa ce benchmark, at 10.6 %. The 
correlation between the Abs_SGA variable and receiving an auditors’ opinion with 
reservations is in the expected direction, but only at 11.8% significance. 
 




Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) ,008 ,002   4,280 ,000 
CGSLS -,003 ,002 -,140 -1,743 ,083 
Auditing -,003 ,002 -,140 -1,628 ,106 
Qualified ,004 ,002 ,130 1,572 ,118 
Abs_Prod ,020 ,006 ,268 3,366 ,001 
7 
Abs_Acc -,001 ,003 -,034 -,427 ,670 
a. Dependant Variable: Abs_SGA 
Statistics R R Square 
Adjusted R  
Square Forecast Error F Sig. 
Model 7 ,426 ,182 ,153 ,008570 6,219 ,000 
 
Finally, Table 8 presents the results of the regression to explain Abs_Prod. Only 
receiving an opinion with reservations is significant to detect earnings management by 
operational choices related to production. Listing i  the Corporate Governance Special 
Segments, although having a correlation in the expected direction, is not sufficiently 
significant. This suggests that being listed for trading in the Corporate Governance Special 
Listing Segments and being audited by one of the Big Four firms is not a guarantee of lower 
propensity to manage earnings through operational decisions involving selling, general and 
administrative expenses. 
 




Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) ,079 ,034   2,324 ,022 
CGSLS -,029 ,023 -,105 -1,240 ,217 
Auditing -,001 ,033 -,002 -,021 ,983 
Qualified ,057 ,034 ,148 1,696 ,092 
Abs_Acc ,163 ,104 ,129 1,573 ,118 
8 
Abs_SGA ,713 ,863 ,072 ,826 ,410 
a. Dependent Variable: Abs_Prod 
Statistics R R Square 
Adjusted R  
Square Forecast Error F Sig. 
Model 8 ,272 ,074 ,042 ,128154 2,322 ,046 
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Although not shown in the tables, to further check the robustness of the statistics of the 
models estimated (besides adjusted R2.), we performed the following additional statistical 
tests:i. Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test, which indicated that the residuals are normally 
distributed; ii. Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test, which sowed no autocorrelation of the residuals; 
iii. Variance inflation factor (VIF) testes, which ruled out the presence of multicollinearity, 
that would biased the results.  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we investigated if listing in the Corprate Governance Special Listing 
Segments, being audited by one of the Big Four and the existence of a qualified auditors’ 
opinion are indicators of earnings management by accounting choices and by operational 
decisions.  
The results of the univariate analysis, subject to parametric and nonparametric tests of 
the difference of means, indicate that Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments and 
auditing by the Big Four assure a lower propensity to manage earnings through accounting 
choices and the presence of an opinion with reservations is an indicator of earnings 
management by accounting choices. With respect to earnings management through 
operational decisions, listing in the Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments, auditing 
by one of the Big Four and receiving an opinion with reservations are not statistically 
significant variables, so other instruments must be sought to minimize the practice of 
operational earnings management. 
The multivariate analysis confirmed in part the results of the univariate analysis, 
indicating that the Big Four Auditor in general reduce the propensity to manage earnings 
through accounting choices, but do not have the same effect for operational earnings 
management. The results also showed that earnings management by operational decisions 
linked to expenses are influenced in the expected direction for companies listed in the 
Corporate Governance Special Listing Segments, but not by the existence of a qualified 
opinion from auditors. Finally, for operational decisions linked to production, the existence of 
a qualified opinion is a signal of earnings management. 
One of the negative consequences of earnings management is increased information 
asymmetry, because this behavior masks the company’s real financial situation. Users of 
accounting information (investors, regulators, share olders and analysts) can make decisions 
based on financial statements that do no depict the real situation. 
The problem of earnings management is that it changes the risk perception of investors. 
If a firm manages it earnings upward, investors will be led to believe the firms is doing better 
than it really is. Firms can also manage earnings downward, to soften the volatility of returns 
and perhaps “save for a rainy day” so to speak, making an upwards adjustment easier in the 
future. The upshot is that the earnings and other financial figures reported, while certainly 
having informational value, cannot be interpreted without a grain of salt. A case-by-case 
analysis is necessary to determine whether a firm is anaging its earnings, and how and in 
what direction. 
One of the difficulties of this type of research is the lack of available data to estimate 
discretionary accruals and the empirical proxies of earnings management through operational 
decisions. Another critical factor that influences analysis of earnings management is the 
heterogeneity of the sample, for instance if composed of commercial firms and financial 
institutions, which can cast doubt on the results.  
While we believe the results demonstrate a statistically significant association between 
corporate governance practices on the one hand and e rnings management on the other, we 
cannot rule out the possible endogeneity between corporate governance practices and earnings 
management or shortcomings of the metrics used as proxies for earnings management. 
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Still, the findings presented in this paper are important to clarify points still not 
conclusively resolved in the international and Brazili n literature. Good practices in corporate 
governance play a useful role in monitoring firms and enhancing transparency.  In the final 
analysis, the conclusions of this paper are important o shed light on the role of corporate 
governance practices, by inhibiting pernicious earnings management.  
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